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Abstract
Customized hardware is expensive and making software reliable is difficult to achieve as
complexity increases. Recent trends towards computing in the cloud have highlighted the
importance of being able to operate continuously in the presence of unreliable hardware
and, as services continue to grow in complexity, it is necessary to build systems that are able
to operate not only in the presence of unreliable hardware but also failure-vulnerable soft-
ware. This thesis describes a newly developed approach for building networking software
that exposes a reliable encapsulation service to clients and runs on unreliable, commodity
hardware without substantially increasing the implementation complexity. The proposal
was implemented in an existing encapsulation system, and experimental analysis has shown
that packets are lost for between 200 ms and 1 second during a failover, and that a failover
adds less than 5 seconds to the total download time of several sizes of files. The approach
described in this thesis demonstrates the viability of building high availability systems
using commodity components and failure-vulnerable server software.
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Encapsulation systems are commonly used to allow unsupported network protocols to run
over an existing network. This is accomplished by wrapping a fully-formed packet from
an unsupported protocol inside another, supported protocol; allowing the network to treat
traffic generated by the unsupported protocol as traffic it already handles. Building a
reliable encapsulation system has traditionally required either complex server-side failover
solutions or weak reliability guarantees, neither of which are particularly appealing ap-
proaches for highly available network systems. This thesis proposes a third approach for
building high reliability encapsulation systems — redundant server-side components with
loose coupling and an intelligent client component that actively maintains connections
with multiple servers and selects the most appropriate server to pass traffic through. This
approach is believed to be easier to implement than existing solutions, provides minimal
packet loss during a server-side failure, works on commodity hardware, and can be adopted
by a variety of encapsulation systems.
Encapsulation is commonly used as an approach to add additional features to the
network without having to change the underlying network protocol — Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) [14], Teredo [11], Mobile Internet Protocol (IP) [18], and IP-in-IP [21]
are all examples of this paradigm. It is common to deploy many of these solutions in
a client/server architecture, with many client devices running the encapsulation protocol
connecting to a single server responsible for decapsulating traffic and passing it on to the
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destination network. In these systems, failures in either the client or server component will
cause network traffic to stop flowing; in the case of a client failure only the local device
will lose access, but in the case of a server failure all of the clients will lose access. Current
systems approach this problem from one of two perspectives: a complex server-side failover
solution that enables clients to maintain connectivity, or a simple approach that does not
maintain connectivity but simply reconnects to a new server.
One of the more complex aspects of handling the failure of a server in the encapsulation
environment is ensuring that traffic is still routed to the client after the failure has occurred.
Encapsulation systems are typically exposed to the client as a virtual network interface
that receives a subset of all IP traffic generated by the client, with each interface being
assigned an IP address that acts as the source IP for all traffic entering the encapsulation
system. The address that is assigned to the client typically comes from a subnet that has
been assigned to the corresponding server, with different servers assigning addresses from
different subnets. Even if all servers assign addresses from the same subnet, they will have
to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) on the addresses before they leave the
server, because it is not possible for two clients to have the same transport address visible
to the wider network. Consequently, if a client disconnects from a server and connects
to another one, it will not keep its transport address, which causes all flows traversing
the encapsulation system to break. This is undesirable because many applications do not
currently handle address changes well; further, it requires handling server failure on a per-
application basis. It be would preferable if migration from one server to another could
be accomplished without changing the address assigned to the virtual interface; that is,
performed in a ‘seamless’ (from the client perspective) manner.
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop a mechanism for software-based encapsula-
tion systems to provide their clients with continuous, uninterrupted service in the presence
of server failures. The most important measure of whether a solution provides continuous
service in the presence of server failures is whether a client application that is passing traffic
through the encapsulation system can continue operating without having the connection
drop, time out, or otherwise close. More specific measures of the impact of a failure include
how many packets are lost during a failover and the impact of a failover on file download
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times. The complexity of the solution is also considered — solutions that require few mod-
ifications to the system and solutions that have components that can be utilized by other
encapsulations systems attempting to achieve similar goals are preferred as they provide
more value to developers of similar systems.
The major contributions of this thesis are the proposal of a new architecture for failure-
tolerant encapsulation systems, the development of an analytical framework to measure
the impact of a failure, and the experimental validation of said architecture in an actual
encapsulation system. The solution detailed in this thesis is believed to be the first exam-
ple of a failure-tolerant encapsulation architecture that neither requires a complex server
implementation, nor passive failover devices. It is believed that this work is applicable
not only in the discussed example but also in other commonly used encapsulation systems,
including Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) transition
technologies, and Mobile IP-capable solutions. Wide adoption of the principles discussed
in this thesis will make it possible to develop and deploy highly available encapsulation
systems in the future, making it easier for individuals or organizations to continue adding
new features to existing network layer protocols without having to develop new approaches
for providing fault-tolerance and high-availability capabilities.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 includes a more detailed descrip-
tion of the problem space, as well as a survey of related approaches. This includes both
research proposals and implemented systems. Next, Chapter 3 contains the design of the
encapsulation reliability solution, with a focus on the overall design of the system and its
impact on system behaviour. Chapter 4 details the implementation of the encapsulation
reliability design in the context of an existing system. In Chapter 5 the implementation is




Background and Related Work
A typical encapsulation system incorporates elements from a variety of computer-science
fields; the underlying transport mechanism is built much like a typical Layer 2 (L2) point-
to-point transport protocol, the packet forwarding logic uses similar algorithms to those
used in traditional Layer 3 (L3) routers, and the reliability and failover behaviour has been
extensively studied in both the high-availability routing literature and the high-availability
distributed systems literature.
The use of encapsulation to support additional functionality on top of the base Internet
Protocol version 4 (IPv4) protocol has a long history of use on the Internet. It is commonly
used in two separate but related roles, legacy support and network isolation. Encapsula-
tion has been used to enable non-IPv4 protocols to be usable over the Internet; there
are a variety of standards describing this mode of operation including Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE), 6to4, and Teredo. A more common deployment architecture, how-
ever, involves using encapsulation to provide network isolation for IPv4 traffic that needs
to traverse the Internet to reach its destination. One common example of encapsulation
providing network isolation can be seen in a VPN scenario. The network-isolation ap-
proach has also been codified in a number of different standards, including both IP-in-IP
and IPsec, as well as being used by application designers (OpenVPN ) to provide similar
isolation capabilities.
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2.1 Traditional Encapsulation Systems
A typical encapsulation architecture has two components, as shown in Figure 2.1. These
components are the Encapsulation Node (EN) and the Decapsulation Node (DN)1. The
EN typically runs on a client device, such as a smartphone or a laptop, and initiates a
connection to the DN. The DN typically runs somewhere in the network that is directly
connected to the next hop destination of the encapsulated traffic. This can include a
private corporate network, the IPv6 Internet, or the IPv4 Internet, depending on the de-
ployment requirements. The EN and DN may participate in one or more authentication
sessions, encryption-algorithm negotiations, or other configuration steps before both end-
points are ready to transfer data. Completion of the initialization process will result in
any packets that the EN receives on its virtual interface being sent to the DN. Each DN
assigns a client an IP address from a pre-configured subnet; each DN is usually assigned
a unique subnet to prevent duplicate addresses. Once the EN has established a session
with the DN, it cannot migrate to another DN without tearing down its session with the
first. This coupling is necessitated both by the assignment of an IP address to the EN
(routing entries to the EN are, by definition, set to have the DN as the next hop) and
potentially by the transport protocol employed by the EN and DN themselves. The use of
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as a transport protocol prevents seamless migration
because sequencing and other state issues prevent the connection from continuing properly
on a new host. Typically, the DN is implemented on specialized or dedicated hardware, to
ensure that the encapsulation system offers high availability to the ENs.
There are two distinct approaches to performing encapsulation — wrapping the data
to be encapsulated directly in IP, or utilizing a transport protocol running over IP to carry
the encapsulated data. There are many standardized examples of both approaches; GRE,
6to4, IP-in-IP, and IPsec all encapsulate their data in raw IPv4 packets, and as a result
have been assigned different IP protocol numbers to allow routers to treat these forms of
traffic differently from TCP or User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Newer protocols have
1While the terms EN and DN are used to differentiate the two devices, both endpoints perform encap-
sulation and decapsulation operations — for simplicity a single direction of traffic flow is assumed in the
rest of this thesis even though it holds for the reverse as well.
5
Figure 2.1: Typical Encapsulation Architecture
adopted the latter approach, with protocols such as Teredo and OpenVPN encapsulating
their data in either TCP or UDP. The reasons for this are discussed below.
Protocols that directly encapsulate traffic in IPv4 are considered to be the preferable
approach because they minimize the amount of overhead added to every packet. While
preferable from an overhead perspective, they encounter major deployment issues on the
Internet today partly as a result of the prevalence of NAT in access networks and partly due
to restrictive firewall configurations. This has caused problems not only for encapsulation
systems (see IPsec passthrough mode on some routers) but for newer transport protocols,
such as Stream Control Transfer Protocol (SCTP) as well. To work around the deployment
issues that NAT introduces, several encapsulation protocols that directly use IPv4, for
example IPsec, have been updated to utilize transport-level encapsulation. RFC 3948
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[12] was developed to allow IPsec to function in the presence of NAT by wrapping the
Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) packets in UDP.
2.2 Traditional Encapsulation Failover
The underlying protocol used to encapsulate data has a direct impact on the complexity
of enabling seamless server failover. Approaches that utilize a stateless transport layer,
either directly using IP or wrapping a payload in UDP, can potentially utilize existing IP-
redundancy protocols such as Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) or Virtual Routing
Redundacy Protocol (VRRP). In such an environment, both servers will be configured
to share a single IP address, with the primary server receiving all traffic and the standby
configured to take over should the primary fail. If the IP-redundancy protocol is used
both on the inbound interface (to allow the client traffic to continue arriving) and on
the outbound interface (to ensure traffic returning from the encapsulation network can be
routed back to the client properly) then the failure of a single server will go unnoticed
by the client. This approach does not, however, work with systems that utilize a stateful
transport layer, because while IP redundancy protocols allow for an IP address to migrate
between servers, they do not do the same for transport connections. There is no widely
supported mechanism to migrate the state of a TCP connection between operating-system
instances, requiring that the client handle failure cases through a reconnection approach.
To allow TCP connections to be migrated between independent operating system in-
stances, researchers have developed a system that integrates with the server-side TCP
stack. This solution, named Fault-Tolerant Transmission Control Protocol (FT-TCP) [1]
[31], combines traditional IP failover protocols with a new component that sits both above
and below the existing TCP stack to intercept all packets being send and received using
TCP. It logs all packets to a data store that is shared amongst all the hosts in the clus-
ter. When a host fails, another takes over and ‘picks up’ from where the last host left
off based upon the state committed to the shared data store. The new host continues
the connection by rewriting all subsequent incoming and outgoing TCP packets to reflect
the proper state of the connection. This enables FT-TCP to overcome the state and se-
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quencing issues which traditionally prevent TCP connections from being able to migrate
between hosts. While FT-TCP enables a TCP connection to be migrated between hosts,
it has several disadvantages - supporting this protocol requires tight coupling with a host
operating system, as well as requiring tight coupling between all the hosts in the cluster.
As well, it requires an active-passive deployment architecture, which tends not to scale in
an efficient manner. One final limitation is that FT-TCP is limited to supporting TCP
failover between different hosts - any application that uses UDP will require a different
solution.
The IP-redundancy protocols have a limitation as well; it is only possible for a single
machine to be the primary server for a specific IP address. Load balancing across HSRP or
VRRP requires multiple IP addresses configured on the cluster with each machine assigned
as primary to one of the addresses [24]. This complicates active-active configurations with
more than a single server because it is now necessary to load balance clients across the IP
addresses exposed by the system.
Utilizing existing IP-redundancy protocols directly has the advantage of simplifying the
client; it simply connects to a single IP address and passes traffic to the server. The tradeoff
to this simplicity is the complexity of the server implementation — it becomes necessary
to synchronize all state used in the decapsulation process between all of the failover servers
in real-time, otherwise a failure of the primary server will result in interruption of service
to the client. This state is not always static — IPsec requires that session keys for each
client be shared between all servers that may process a client’s traffic, and any service with
restricted access requires that authentication information be shared between all servers.
The complexity of this state synchronization only increases as the encapsulation system is
expanded to support a larger number of servers that can be simultaneously used, especially
in load-balancing architectures. It is relatively straightforward to synchronize two servers
that are sharing an IP address in an active/passive architecture, but synchronizing many
servers in an active/active architecture is a much more difficult problem.
The approach proposed here sidesteps many of these concerns by pushing the failover
logic into the client — a small amount of extra logic enables clients to connect to an
arbitrary number of servers that do not need to be directly synchronized with the other
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servers in the failover cluster. It enables the solution to scale to a large number of servers in
an active/active architecture without requiring complex server-side logic or configuration
parameters to support, and does not require scaling IP-redundancy protocols.
2.3 The Complexity of IP Continuity
In order to provide the client a continuous, uninterrupted connection to the Internet, it is
necessary to provide more than just a redundant connection to the decapsulator, it is also
necessary to ensure that the IP address assigned to its virtual interface does not change
as the client moves between decapsulators. The IP address assigned to the EN is able to
migrate between interfaces as the EN enters and leaves different networks as long as it
is communicating with the same DN; the DN advertises the subnet from which the EN
addresses are assigned and other routers use this information to send the EN’s traffic to
the proper DN. In most environments this is statically configured because the information
is not dynamic — if a DN goes down then all of the ENs connected to it are no longer
reachable. This mode of operation is not acceptable in a fault-tolerant system, however,
and as a result it is necessary to ensure that an EN’s IP address will migrate between DNs
in the relevant failure scenarios.
Providing IP continuity to clients in an encapsulation system has not been the focus
of a lot of literature to this point, router-reliability protocols such as HSRP or VRRP
excepted. There are two related fields that have received a lot of research recently, however
— supporting address reassignments (for a variety of reasons) and providing IP continuity
in virtualized datacentres. A summary of the relevant research of each field is presented
below.
2.3.1 Address Translation
Address translation is a somewhat overloaded term; here the intent is not to refer to the
one-to-many NAT commonly used to provide connectivity to many clients behind a single
IP address, instead the term is used to refer to a one-to-one NAT whereby each client has
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a unique address on both sides of the NAT device, these addresses just happen to exist in
different address spaces. This approach is used not only to help reduce the size of global
routing tables, but also to simplify the transition to IPv6.
The paper Towards a new Internet routing architecture [30] observes that one of the
biggest contributions to the growth of the global BGP routing table is the number of
Provider Independent (PI) address subnets that are being assigned, and examines several
solutions to reduce the impact that PI networks have on the global routing table while
still allowing for multihoming across independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs). PI
addressing space is named as such because it is not allocated from address blocks that
carriers have been assigned (hence, ‘provider independent’), both to simplify renumber-
ing when changing providers and to enable multihoming. The use of PI addressing has
increased in recent years for both of the previously mentioned reasons; unfortunately it
is essentially impossible to aggregate PI addresses because they are inherently assigned
to disjoint organizations. This dramatically increases the size of the global routing table,
since all providers now need to know how to reach each PI block independently. To support
PI addressing while still enabling address aggregation, Towards a new Internet routing ar-
chitecture [30] proposes a two-layer addressing scheme whereby PI space is mapped into
Provider Assigned (PA) addresses, which enables clients to be assigned a single address
that is persistent across ISP failure, and in effect enables IP continuity in a failure environ-
ment. Essentially, the border routers between the PI and PA addressing spaces perform a
version of one-to-one NAT, except that multiple ‘public’ addresses map to a single ‘private’
address.
The author of Six/One [29] proposes a solution for enabling PI addressing in IPv6
deployments by deploying what are essentially one-to-one NAT devices on both sides of
the transit network. This architecture is similar to Towards a new Internet routing archi-
tecture [30] because it relies on a transparent, in-network mechanism for mapping client
addresses to globally reachable addresses in such a manner that an assigned globally reach-
able address can change without impacting the client address or its connections. This does
not completely work with IPv4, however, because it relies upon an IPv6 extension header
to carry the original, untranslated address to the end host, making it possible for other
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hosts to associate connections coming from two different addresses as actually coming from
the same host (if the PI-to-PA mapping changes partway through a connection). Clearly,
this is a major limitation, because upgrading all end hosts on the Internet to understand
multiple sets of addresses in the IP header is not a trivial or rapidly accomplished task.
Both Towards a new Internet routing architecture [30] and Six/One [29] are built with
the assumption that the PI space is managed independently from the PA address space,
allowing the organization to manage the operation of the PI space as it wishes. This is
an important aspect of both approaches; organizations have the flexibility to move hosts
throughout their organization without interrupting existing connections. Adapting this to
an encapsulation system requires an extra layer of indirection be added to the system, yet
if the routes can be properly adjusted within the organization during a failure it is possible
to hide this failure from existing connections.
2.3.2 Datacentre Networking
The adoption of virtualization technology in the datacentre has provided a number of
advantages to operators, including improved utilization, increased flexibility, and higher
uptime. Virtual Machines (VMs) are able to be migrated between physical systems, making
it possible for physical hosts to be taken down for maintenance without requiring any
observable downtime. Virtual-machine migration is a substantial advantage provided by a
virtual environment; however, enabling this migration greatly complicates the underlying
network infrastructure. Different VMs are expected to run on different networks, and
moving these machines between physical hosts requires that every possible network a VM
is connected to be available to all of the physical hosts on which said VM could possibly
execute. In effect, every physical host needs to have connectivity to every network any of
the VMs could use. Furthermore, it is necessary for the underlying network to be able to
switch packets destined to a given VM to the physical host on which this VM is currently
executing, something that will dynamically change during a VM migration. Addressing
some of these obstacles to VM migration in a datacentre network has been the focus of
several recent papers, discussed below.
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PortLand [17] presents a network architecture that is designed to support host mobility
in a datacentre. The major focus of the work in PortLand is modifying the underlying
L2 protocol (Ethernet) to enable the required L3 mobility features in a virtualized dat-
acentre. They accomplish this by replacing the broadcast behaviour of Ethernet with a
centralized directory of Media Access Control (MAC) addresses-to-switchport mappings
that are transparently updated by inspecting outgoing packets from each switchport. A
side benefit of eliminating Ethernet broadcasting is that it reduces the amount of traffic
that hosts connected to the network need to process. The modifications to Ethernet in
PortLand are not just constrained to supporting IP mobility; the centralized directory is
responsible not only for maintaining a MAC-to-port mapping but also detecting failures in
the network fabric and switching the selected path to prevent a loss of connectivity.
Floodless in SEATTLE [15] is another paper that explores the limitations of the Eth-
ernet protocol in the context of supporting IP mobility for VMs. Much like PortLand,
SEATTLE removes the broadcast-address lookup component with something considerably
more scalable; however, in contrast to PortLand, it proposes collapsing all the L3 subnets
into a single broadcast domain which is run across all switches in the network. While
a single broadcast domain would be infeasible if broadcasting was used, the switches are
modified to use a distributed hash table (DHT) to perform L2 address resolutions in lieu of
the traditional broadcast-based solutions, removing one of the major impediments to large
subnets in a datacentre. With all of the VM IPs now on the same subnet, it is possible
to relocate a VM anywhere in the datacentre without worrying about how the switching
infrastructure will interact with the routing infrastructure — an L3 device can sit on the
edge of the datacentre and let the switching infrastructure take care of the rest.
Supporting IP continuity in a datacentre network requires modifying the underlying
transport protocol, and while different approaches are taken they all remove the broad-
casting component from Ethernet and replace it with a centralized data store that can be
updated dynamically when the structure of the network changes. This is unfortunately
something which is not feasible to replicate directly in an encapsulation system because
most existing encapsulation systems are built under the assumption that the DN performs
both L2 and L3 functions, making it infeasible to have multiple DNs share a logical L2
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address space. However, the approach can be moved one layer up the stack, and instead
of having a centralized directory of MAC-to-switchport mappings each DN could write to
a centralized directory of IP-to-DN mappings, and allow the DN to use its existing mech-
anism to map IPs to encapsulation links. As long as the directory is updated when IPs
move DNs, IP continuity will exist for the ENs.
2.4 Software Routing
Traditional IP routers are built using custom silicon that embeds forwarding logic into
hardware; while capable of forwarding at very high rates (over 10 Gbps) they are expensive
both to build and deploy, and are unable to support protocol changes easily. There have
been various attempts to address these limitations by using a commodity machine running
a commodity operating system (typically Linux), yet the performance of a commodity
platform has never been able to match that of the custom silicon found in dedicated routers.
The performance issue has resulted in software routers being relegated to use in branch
offices and development labs, but not in major datacentres. Indeed, most encapsulation
systems today that include routing functionality are built into dedicated routers, and are
not typically deployed on general-purpose computers [22].
Recently, the field of software routing has experienced an increase in interest due to
several different but related factors. First, advancements in both processor architectures
and network-interface card designs have dramatically increased the rate at which general-
purpose machines are able to process network traffic, addressing one of the largest barriers
that software routers traditionally faced. The advancements in processor architectures has
not just increased the speed and number of cores that can exist on a chip; operating-
system virtualization has become a popular way to increase datacentre utilization while
also increasing the uptime and flexibility of the overall system. Features like virtual-
machine migration and hot failover of virtual machines have introduced changes to the
way datacentre networks are being designed and operated, yet the underlying network
technology has not seen a similar rate of change. It is difficult to determine if this is because
such changes are not necessary, or if the cost of the existing infrastructure is preventing
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innovation from extending to the datacentre networking field. The difficulty of adding
features to dedicated routers has been an impediment to deploying new capabilities to
virtualized datacentres; motivating further interest in adopting software routing technology
due to the simplicity of updating software routers.
The authors of Towards high performance virtual routers on commodity hardware [8]
explored the limits of running a software router on a commodity server, and discovered
that the memory subsystem is the source of bottlenecks in a typical mid-range multicore
server system performing software routing. They were able to achieve forwarding rates of
approximately 7-million packets per second for 40-byte packets, after carefully mapping
routing processes to cores. They also explored the impact of running software routers in
virtual machines; virtualization technology was discovered to have a significant impact on
the obtainable forwarding rates, with a virtualized instance achieving between 1 and 2
million 40-byte packets per second in the best case. Given that decapsulation nodes are,
fundamentally, software routers with additional logic, this provides an important practical
upper limitation on the performance which each DN can be expected to achieve. This paper
also explores the impact of different approaches to sharing physical network interfaces with
virtualized routers; when the network card is able to perform packet de-multiplexing and
assign each virtualized router an independent packet queue on the NIC it is possible to
achieve much better isolation and fairness metrics as compared to having the hypervisor
handle all packet processing itself. This is unsurprising but an important factor to consider
when building virtualized routers — the capabilities of the underlying hardware can have
a major impact on the performance that each routing instance is capable of achieving.
The issue of scaling software routers running on commodity hardware to multi-gigabit
rates is examined in Can software routers scale? [2], where the authors examine the impact
that the architecture of commodity hardware has on the potential performance achievable
by a software router. They propose an architecture not dissimilar to the one proposed in
this thesis whereby a collection of routers are clustered together to achieve higher through-
put rates than would be otherwise achieved by a single machine; however, they focus on
building a single logical router from multiple machines which are interconnected using a
Valient load-balancing mesh. The key observation underlying their paper is that one of the
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most basic limitations of existing software routers is that they focus on the ‘single server as
router’ architecture, yet this is fundamentally unable to match the performance of custom
hardware; therefore, future software routers will need to be built using a clustered archi-
tecture to obtain speeds comparable to custom hardware using a software router. The
programmability of a software router is also highlighted as a key advantage of this ap-
proach; it becomes easier and less expensive to deploy new capabilities to existing routers.
ViAggre [3] presents an architecture by which the growth of the Default Free Zone
(DFZ) is addressed by splitting the global routing table onto a collection of routers through
the use of virtual network prefixes. This is, in effect, attempting to solve the same problem
as Towards a new Internet Routing Architecture [30], large routing tables due to increases
in PI addressing, yet instead of attempting to solve the source of the problem it instead
proposes a way to hide the impact of the issue. The use of virtual network prefixes makes
it possible to have large swaths of relatively unused address space handled by a single
router, while allowing the more popular subnets to be handled by dedicated machines,
and dynamically shifting the assignment of prefixes to routers can allow for dynamic load
balancing across the routing cluster. This is similar to the approach proposed in Can soft-
ware routers scale? [2] whereby less capable devices are shown to have a higher aggregate
throughput by splitting the load across a cluster of machines. Splitting the routing table
into components that are loaded onto different routers is similar to the approach presented
in this thesis takes to separate load across the different decapsulators in the system, where
the ingress router knows how to route specific packets to the responsible decapsulator.
The work in Can software routers scale? [2] is extended in RouteBricks: Exploiting par-
allelism to scale software routers [7], where the authors implement the proposed software-
router architecture and validate its performance using several real-world benchmarks. The
prototype is shown to be capable of forwarding at a rate of 35 Gbps using a 4-server cluster;
an impressive demonstration that modern commodity machines are capable of forwarding
at rates that used to be exclusively obtainable with customized hardware. The imple-
mentation resulted in several important results; first, the Central Processing Unit (CPU)
architecture plays an important role in achieving high throughputs — the parallel memory
bus present in the Intel Nehalem architecture was required to achieve the required forward-
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ing performance, and shared-memory-bus CPUs were incapable of obtaining a comparable
level of performance. Second, it was necessary to use multi-packet queue network cards
to avoid queue-CPU core contention. Finally, it was necessary to pin each CPU core to a
specific network-card packet queue to avoid cross-core queue locking.
The encapsulation system presented in this thesis is not expected to be deployed in en-
vironments that require extremely high packet-forwarding performance, because the clients
are expected to be connecting to the server over the Internet, and most datacentres are
connected to the Internet using links that have a capacity in the small single digits of Giga-
bits per second. Given that others have demonstrated systems that are capable of pushing
much higher rates than the system proposed in this thesis is expected to handle using a
small cluster of commodity machines, it validates the feasibility of the system running as
a software router on commodity hardware.
2.5 Handling Decapsulator Failure
The software reliability field has two perspectives on the development of fault-tolerant
software — perform extensive testing on all possible failure cases to ensure that the software
never crashes, or build in the assumption that software will fail and ensure that failure
handling does not break the system. The second approach is much easier to implement
and validate in complex software, especially when safety is not a concern. There are
many variations on this general approach to building software, but two major approaches
are to detect and try to handle any errors that occur or to crash whenever an error is
detected. Software that implements the second approach is called ‘crash only’ software,
and this is the approach that more and more highly reliable, highly parallel solutions are
adopting [5] [13] [6] [10].
Traditionally the networking field has not adopted the ‘crash only’ approach because
it is not terribly difficult to build mostly reliable software on reliable hardware, and with
custom hardware forming the basis for most networking gear it is expected that hardware
failures will be relatively rare. Indeed, for the few cases when failure is not tolerated,
specialized failover approaches have been developed, yet these are often complex and in-
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flexible. As the networking field begins to utilize software routers running on commodity
hardware, it is important to recognize the intrinsic differences between the two approaches
and the additional work required for systems running on commodity hardware to offer
similar reliability guarantees.
Integrating a ‘crash only’ approach to an existing encapsulation system is greatly simpli-
fied when IP continuity is provided to ENs during a failure — a small process can monitor
the state of each DN and forcibly kill it if required. Clients that are written assuming a DN
can go down at any time will simply switch to an alternate DN when the primary stops,
either due to a failure of the software or the hardware. Minus some small packet loss, the





A reliable encapsulation endpoint architecture does not exist in a vacuum; it is built on top
of existing encapsulation systems, and therefore the design will be implemented differently
depending on the specifics of the particular encapsulation system in question. The high-
level architecture of the encapsulation endpoint reliability architecture is discussed here
in relation to the previously-discussed standard encapsulation architecture, and how IP
continuity is provided for that architecture. A specific implementation is described in
Chapter 4.
The encapsulation endpoint reliability architecture proposed in this thesis, in contrast
to a traditional encapsulation architecture, has four components; the encapsulation node
(EN), the decapsulation node (DN), the decapsulation node failure detector (DN-FD), and
the edge service router (ESR). In this architecture the EN and DN occupy the same roles
that they do in the traditional encapsulation architecture, with some minor differences.
The ESR acts to ensure that the IP address assigned to an EN can be migrated between
DNs when a failure occurs by maintaining a system-wide EN-to-DN map. The DN-FD
acts to detect failures in the DN, and kills nodes acting in an erroneous manner.
One difference between our architecture and a typical encapsulation architecture is
that the failover DNs are not run on specialized hardware; instead commodity hardware
is used. While typical encapsulation systems may deploy DNs on commodity hardware,
failover-capable versions of these DNs tend to be deployed on custom hardware. Another
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Figure 3.1: Failover Encapsulation Architecture
difference is that instead of having the EN connect only to a single DN, the EN connects to
multiple (n, n >1) DNs, where n is one more than the greatest number of concurrent DN
failures that are to be supported. The first DN to which the EN connects is responsible for
sending configuration settings, including IP address, to the EN — this DN also becomes
the initial destination for all client traffic. During the connection setup process with the
additional n-1 DNs, the EN supplies its configuration (including assigned IP address) and
marks the DN as ‘secondary’. Being marked as ‘secondary’ does not cause the DN to treat
the EN any differently than it would if it were primary; it simply maintains the session in
preparation for a failover situation.
The architecture providing failover capabilities to an encapsulation system is shown in
Figure 3.1. Each of the DNs, in addition to being connected to the Internet (to terminate
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EN connections), is connected to the Edge Service Router (ESR) using whatever version of
IP the encapsulation system supports (IPv4 or IPv6). The network connected to the ESR
is whatever the intended destination for this encapsulation system is; possibilities include
a private IP network, the public IPv6 Internet, or the public IPv4 Internet. The version of
IP running on this network matches the protocol type used to determine the IP addresses
assigned to the EN. When the primary DN assigns an IP address to the EN, it does so
out of its own address pool, and the ESR is configured with the address ranges assigned
to each DN. When the DN receives a packet from the EN, it decapsulates the packet and
injects it into the network where it will be routed through the ESR before traveling to
its final destination. Packets returning from an end host pass through the ESR, where it
routes the packet to the proper DN, at which point it follows the standard encapsulation
protocol for returning to the EN.
Every DN is configured with two classes of subnets, primary and secondary, instead of
being configured with a single subnet. A primary subnet is used by a primary DN to assign
addresses to clients that are not yet connected to a DN. A secondary subnet is one that
contains part of a primary subnet on a different DN, and reflects which ENs will fail-over
to the DN should its primary fail — this is used to reduce the potential impact of churn on
the routing table during DN failures. Additional details on primary and secondary subnets
can be found in Section 4.4.
Since ENs will migrate between DNs as a result of DN failure, it is necessary for the
ESR to have an up-to-date view of which EN is connected to which DN. Establishing such
a mapping of ENs to DNs is analogous to creating and maintaining a routing table; each EN
acts as an end host and each DN acts as a packet router. This association table is referred to
as the EN-DN Mapping Table; further, it must act as a reliable data store to ensure that the
failure of any DN or ESR does not cause an interruption in service. Given the similarity in
functionality to a routing table, the EN-DN Mapping Table could be implemented using one
of several common dynamic routing protocols, including Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
or Routing Information Protocol (RIP). An alternative approach would be to utilize an
existing reliable shared data store, such as the Google Chubby Lock Service [4], to persist
the mapping table. The use of Chubby to store small pieces of identification information
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(such as host name to IP mappings) has been demonstrated by Google; such a service could
feasibly store the EN-DN Mapping Table reliably as well. Both the DN and ESR read and
write to the EN-DN Mapping Table; the exact method that they use to access the table
depends upon the specific mapping table implementation; however, all implementations
will require a component running on each DN and each ESR. When choosing how to store
the EN-DN Mapping Table it is necessary to consider how both the DN and ESR will
interact with the table; using an existing routing protocol would allow existing dedicated
hardware to fulfill the ESR role; using a custom software solution like Chubby would
preclude this approach.
The DN-FD is an independently developed piece of software that runs on each DN
and monitors the state of the system to detect component failures (both hardware and
software). This piece of software is independent of the specific encapsulation system; by
separating the encapsulation system from the failure detector it is possible to build a small,
well-tested, and robust failure detector that can be utilized across different encapsulation
implementations. The design and implementation of the DN-FD can leverage much of the
research that has already been done in this field; indeed it could be feasible to allow the DN
to signal error conditions directly to the DN-FD rather than just relying on the DN-FD to
detect all possible failures. Upon detecting a failure or inferring the presence of a failure,
the DN-FD forcibly terminates the DN software and restarts it after a configurable period
of time. The amount of time that will elapse before restarting the DN will depend on the
number of previous failures, the load on the system, and other detected hardware issues.
As long as one of the secondary DNs is still working, the system will continue functioning
as before (ignoring the packet loss that will occur before the client realizes that the DN
has failed), ensuring reliability as long as one secondary DN is still available.
3.1 DN Failover
When the primary DN fails, the EN selects one of its secondary DNs to take over, and
begins sending all of its traffic to this DN. Given that the DN had already been initialized,
there is no delay in establishing a handshake with the DN, performing authentication, or
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Figure 3.2: System Prior to (a) and Following (b) Failure of a DN
any other initial connection tasks specific to a particular encapsulation implementation.
When a secondary DN begins receiving traffic from the EN, it marks itself as the primary
for this EN, and updates the EN-DN Mapping Table to inform all other DNs and ESRs
that it is now responsible for packets destined to the specific EN. Figure 3.2 shows a simple
example of a single EN and two DNs that experience a DN failure. Here, the system is
functioning normally in Figure 3.2 (a), and once DN1 has failed Figure 3.2 (b) shows
the result of the EN failing over, with DN2 adding the EN host address into the EN-DN
Mapping Table.
At this point, all traffic from the client is properly redirected back to the EN over one
of the secondary DNs without a substantial interruption of service. While some packets
are lost, including all outstanding packets in transit to the primary DN along with any
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packets returning to the DN from the destination server before the routing rule is applied,
this likely constitutes a small fraction of all the packets that are transmitted during the life
of a typical encapsulation session. This can be partially remedied by performing buffering
on the EN if packet loss is found to be a substantial issue; this possibility has not been
explored further here as transport-level retransmissions were considered sufficient.
Handling DN recovery has two elements; how the restarted DN handles new clients,
and how ENs that previously used the DN are migrated back. When a DN first starts,
it reads the EN-DN Mapping Table and notes any addresses from its address range that
are currently in use by other DNs. It then ensures that it does not assign any of these
addresses to newly connecting clients. When a DN handling clients that are not part of
its primary subnet notices that the DN for this subnet is alive, it informs the EN that the
primary DN is available again. The EN uses this information to establish a new session
with the DN and once it has completed the initialization routine it marks the original
DN as primary again and informs the secondary DN. The secondary DN, upon receiving
this message, removes any information it had in the EN-DN Mapping Table, allowing the
default rule to again take effect and have the client resume communication through the
primary DN. Cleaning up the mapping table is important; if default rules are not relied
upon it is possible for the table to grow in an unwieldy manner as DNs hosting secondary
subnets fail and need to be further split.
3.2 Detecting Failures
The types of failures that the DN-FD needs to be capable of handling depends on the
expected failure model of the system; the interaction between the DN-FD and the system
is shown in Figure 3.3. Here it is assumed that the failures experienced by both the
DN and the hardware that the DN is executing on are classified as fail-stop; unexpected
states cause the DN software to crash, while hardware issues cause the entire system to
go down. Should the DN-FD detect packet corruption, memory corruption, or any other
‘soft’ failures then it will kill the system, enabling a fail-stop model to be used to describe
all classes of failures that the system experiences. The DN-FD should be liberal in what it
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Figure 3.3: DN-FD Architecture
determines to be a failure state — it is desirable to have a failure detector that is capable
of identifying every error condition even if it has a non-zero false positive detection rate.
As long as the false negative rate is zero the system will operate without issue; bringing
the false positive rate down is merely an efficiency issue. This is preferable to the system
experiencing a correctness issue by having a non-zero false negative rate.
The EN is able to detect a DN failure using one of two approaches: detecting the
DN failure itself, or having the secondary DN notify it that the primary has failed. The
former approach can signal an error relatively quickly when failures are isolated to the DN
software; the DN host returns a Port Unreachable message to the EN as soon as data is
sent. The latter approach requires additional complexity in the DN cluster, however it
results in a faster failover when the DN host fails because the EN is not stuck waiting for a
host that is no longer available to respond. A basic monitoring strategy would be for every
secondary DN to monitor all of the DNs that its connected ENs are using as the primary.
If an error occurs, all of the secondary DNs would then notify the EN of the failure. This
approach has room for optimization, both from the perspective of how the EN is notified
of a failure and the amount of processing that each DN is required to perform to ensure
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the EN is informed of a failure quickly.
The distributed nature of the described encapsulation system adds many different
sources of failures to the system. There are three major classes of failures that can be
encountered: network failures, hardware failures, and software failures. Network failures
are considered last; first the impact that hardware and software failures have on the be-
haviour of the system is explored.
The use of commodity hardware as the underlying platform for the DNs exposes the
system to many hardware failures; cost is often the primary concern when building com-
modity systems and reliability is often sacrificed to meet this goal (error-correcting RAM
is rarely used, as one small example). Hardware failures on a given DN can be detected
by the DN-FDs running on the other DNs in the cluster; given that all the DNs are well-
connected, there is minimal overhead in having a sub-second heartbeat shared by each
DN-FD. It is difficult for ENs to rapidly detect a DN failure caused by hardware failure;
connections do not immediately time out and there is also the path latency between EN
and DN slowing things down. Having each DN monitor the status of all other DNs enables
a secondary DN to inform all of its ENs that their primary has failed and they should
initiate a failover.
The implementation complexity of typical encapsulation software virtually guarantees
that there will be failures caused by the DN software; it is the primary responsibility of the
DN-FD to catch these and terminate the DN. It is possible for the DN-FD to monitor not
just the DN software but also operating-system behaviour to detect anomalous conditions.
As mentioned earlier, these are solved by immediately killing the DN; there is little cost
in doing this because of the seamless-failover mechanism.
Rapidly detecting failure of the network is, in contrast, difficult to accomplish in a
data-efficient manner due to the difficulty in distinguishing arbitrary packet loss from a
failure case. The proposed failover architecture does not provide IP continuity in most
network-failure cases, because the DNs and ESR are located in the same logical network
location. Loss of connectivity to one DN as a result of a network failure, then, implies that
connectivity has been lost to all DNs. Handling DN failure across independent network
locations is an area of future work; it is clearly difficult to ensure IP continuity for the
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Figure 3.4: Network Failure Scenarios
client across independent network locations. It is assumed that the DN cluster is deployed
in a hub-and-spoke fashion, with each DN, ESR and border gateway connected to the
subnet through a single L2 link. Thus, network failure either occurs by partitioning a
single DN from the network (link failure) as shown in Figure 3.4 (a), or the hub dies and
removes connectivity to all DNs, shown in Figure 3.4 (b). It is not expected that multi-
node partition scenarios will be encountered. If a link failure occurs within the DN cluster
it will be detected in the same manner as DN host failure; the DN-FD running on other
DNs will be unable to reach the DN and will mark it as dead.
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3.3 ESR Failover
Introducing the ESR component into the architecture has the potential to add another
failure point into the system; however, the simplicity of the ESR role makes it easy to sup-
port failover using existing protocols. Fundamentally, the role of the ESR is to determine
which DN is able to reach a specific network address. It accomplishes this by participating
in a routing algorithm in which all of the DNs also participate. It advertises itself as the
next hop for all DN-assigned addresses and, as a result, it functions in a similar manner
to a peering router in a standard routing architecture.
Accomplishing the above tasks in a failover-capable manner is something that every
common enterprise router needs to accomplish; as a result, many standards have been
developed to enable this functionality. Running a pair of commodity routers, either hard-
ware or software, that share a virtual IP address using any existing protocol (HSRP [23],
VRRP [16], or Common Address Redundancy Protocol (CARP) [25]) will enable a cluster
of ESRs to provide fully transparent failover to the DNs without requiring any DN-specific
logic. In fact, existing hardware can be re-purposed to accomplish this.
3.4 Analytical Analysis of a Failover
In order to characterize the behaviour of the system during a failure a brief analysis of
the operation of the system during a failure has been performed. This analysis will help
to provide context to the results in Chapter 5 and provide a brief sanity check to ensure
that the measured results are logical. Recovering from a node failure in the system is
characterized by three key events which all impact the speed at which a failover will occur.
The system is shown in Figure 3.5, where a failure occurs at time T0. Prior to T0 the
system is behaving properly; traffic is being encapsulated at the EN and is flowing through
DN1. At T0, the DN software running on DN1 experiences a failure and is killed. This
stops all traffic flowing between the client application and the server.
At time T1, the EN detects that DN1 has failed. The exact nature by which the client
determines the existence of a failure is not relevant here, as the minimum bound can be
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Figure 3.5: Timeline Of System States During Failover
calculated independently of failure detection mechanism. The minimum value of T1 is:




It will take at least half of a round trip for the notification to travel from the DN to the
EN; it will also take δ time for the DN host to to detect that the DN process has died
and close the connections previously owned by this process. At time T1 the EN changes
its behaviour and begins directing all of the client-application traffic to DN2. DN2 first
determines that a failure has occurred at T2, when it receives a message from the EN.
This will occur approximately RTT
2
seconds after T1, assuming that the message is not
delayed or lost due to unfavourable network conditions. At time T2 DN2 marks itself as
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the primary DN for the EN, and injects a route into its local routing table. This means
that at T2 the client application is able to send traffic to the server properly; unfortunately,
the server is not able to pass data to the client application, because the reverse route from
the server to client has not yet propagated to the ESR.
Once the DN daemon running on DN2 has injected the EN route update, a variable
amount of time will pass before the routing daemon, also running on DN2, will detect the
routing-table change. T3 is defined as the time when the routing daemon has detected
the addition to the routing table, at which point the routing daemon broadcasts this
information to the other DNs and the ESR in an update message. The ESR, connected on
the same subnet to both DNs, will receive this update message some time after T3. Once
the routing daemon running on the ESR has processed the packet and has injected the
route into its routing table, the system will have reached time T4. T4 is defined as the time
when the system is again functioning properly and traffic can flow bidirectionally between
the client application and the server.
One possible, but somewhat complex, optimization that can be made to reduce the
overall time to complete a failover involves DN2 detecting the failure of DN1 itself. This
would allow the time between T3 and T4 to proceed in parallel with the time between T1
and T2, reducing the failover time to the maximum of these two time intervals. Given that
the typical latency between a client and server running over the Internet is in the range
of tens or hundreds of milliseconds, having DN2 mark itself as primary before the EN has
detected the failure would result in a decrease in the failover time observed by the EN.
This optimization is safe even if DN1 has not died — traffic originating from the EN will
continue to pass through DN1, while traffic returning to the EN will pass through DN2.
This asynchronous routing situation is not ideal; however, traffic is still able to flow in
both directions because both links are available.
In addition to understanding the sources of delay, it is important to understand the
characteristics of each delay source to help improve the understanding of why certain results
are observed in the experimental results. The differences between T0 and T1 and T1 and T2
are likely to be somewhat static regardless of the test, as the RTT in a typical environment
is likely to be relatively stable. The difference between T2 and T3 is much more variable,
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however, as the routing daemon polls the routing table on a fixed interval, yet the EN
route can be injected at any point in this interval. The scanning interval configured on our
system was 1 second, the smallest value supported by the bird routing daemon. Finally, the
time between T3 and T4 is going to depend upon the behaviour of the DN/ESR network
and the current packet loss rate, as the multicast delivery mechanism does not guarantee
that a routing update be received by all the other nodes. With a presumed low loss rate,





The proposed endpoint reliability architecture has been implemented within the context
of an existing encapsulation system named Accoriem. This encapsulation system was
designed to provide mobility and aggregation services to multi-interface mobile devices
and uses a combination of a TCP-based control channel and a UDP-based data channel
that runs on each available physical interface, enabling potential bandwidth aggregation,
seamless handoffs between networks, and remote manageability of the device. This system
is believed to be a reasonable example of a real-world encapsulation system — it maintains
multiple independent connections between the client and the server and requires both
transport and application-level state to be maintained between endpoints. It was not
developed simply for this thesis — it is a system that existed prior to this thesis and has
seen real-world adoption. Implementing the encapsulation endpoint reliability architecture
within the Accoriem system allows for an EN to function seamlessly in the presence of DN
failures.
4.1 Accoriem
To provide some context to the discussion of the failover implementation, a brief description
of the standard Accoriem architecture is provided. Figure 4.1 shows the primary compo-
nents of the system involved in establishing a connection from the EN to the DN and then
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Figure 4.1: Accoriem System Components
passing encapsulating application traffic between the endpoints. A detailed description of
the Accoriem system can be found in Practical Multi-Interface Network Access for Mobile
Devices [20]; however, it provides substantially more detail than is required here.
The EN is composed of a series of modules that are responsible for encapsulating and
decapsulating traffic and maintaining connection with the DN. As shown in Figure 4.1,
there are four core modules in the EN. The tunnel module is responsible for handling the
virtual-tunnel interface, including reading and writing IP packets entering and leaving the
system and assigning the virtual IP address to the interface. The connector module is
responsible for detecting physical-interface state changes and connecting to the DN when a
new interface is available. This module receives configuration state from the DN, including
the virtual IP address. Once the connection has been established the link is passed to
the host module. The host module is responsible for maintaining the links with the DN,
sending and receiving packets over the appropriate interface, detecting DN loss, and other
similar tasks. The client module acts as a go-between for the other modules; it does not
have a major role in the base Accoriem system.
The DN is built in a similar manner, both the tunnel and host modules are the same
as in the EN because they perform the same roles regardless of which side of the link they
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are on. The connection handler module handles incoming connection requests from new
clients, and is responsible for getting the client into a configured state before the EN is
ready to pass traffic; once the host has been configured, the connection is passed to the
server module. The server module is responsible for maintaining the collection of host
objects; one for each connected EN. The server is more complex than the equivalent
client module, however, as packets received by the tunnel module are not all destined
for the same EN. In the EN case, all received packets are destined for the DN, so they are
all passed to the same host. The server module maintains a lookup table of host objects
indexed by their virtual IP address, allowing packets received by the tunnel to be passed
quickly to the appropriate EN. This lookup mechanism is also used to ensure that new
connections are passed from the connection handler to the correct host.
4.2 EN and DN Modifications
A high-level architecture of both the failure-tolerant EN and DN can be found in Figure
4.2; the modules with a gray background required modifications to support DN failover.
It is shown that changes were required on both the EN and DN; however, it is notable
how isolated the required changes were. The existing data path was essentially untouched,
suggesting that the addition of DN failover capabilities should not change the overhead or
delay introduced by the system during normal operation.
Changes to the EN involved two major components: the connection-initiation and
connection-management modules. The connection-initiation module required two addi-
tions: detecting the existence of the backup DNs and sending additional configuration
parameters from the EN to the backup DNs. Given that each set of connections to a DN
is independent from all other DNs, it was possible simply to introduce a collection of DNs
to connect to, and duplicate the existing connection initiator so that each one properly
connected to its respective DN. Initially choosing the primary DN is simple — the first one
to successfully connect is the primary. This not only ensures that the client is connected
as quickly as possible, it also simplifies the connection process by having a generic con-
nection approach (rather than different behaviours for the primary and secondary links).
33
Figure 4.2: Accoriem Components: Modified Modules shown in Gray
Sending additional configuration parameters just extended the existing post-connection
configuration logic to inform the backup DNs of the encapsulated IP address of the given
host.
The EN-side changes to the connection-management module primarily involved repli-
cating the existing connection management and DN control logic to support multiple DNs.
The host module was initially responsible for transferring commands between the EN and
DN, determining how to split traffic between the existing interfaces, and managing link
information (latency, packet-loss rate, etc.). Rather than complicate the existing link-
management code an additional layer of abstraction was added in the form of the client
module, which receives packets to be encapsulated from the tunnel and passes them to
the host for transmission to the DN. This was also done to avoid complicating the design
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by introducing additional failure-tolerant code into the host module. Instead of handling
a single host, the client maintains a collection of host objects; each representing an
active DN. When the primary host informs the client it has disconnected, the client
chooses another host from its collection and begins passing all traffic over this host. The
DN failure-detection code already existed, and changes to the client were constrained to
how the client received newly created host objects from the connector and which host
would be passed traffic from the tunnel module.
The DN required changes in two modules: the initial client-connection handler and the
packet-processing module. It also required the creation of a new module to handle route
injection. The initial client-connection handler was modified to take encapsulator address
information from the client on backup DNs, a trivial extension of the existing configuration
mechanism. The creation of a module to inject routes was similarly straightforward: by
hooking into the Linux kernel netlink interface, the process of adding routes took little
additional code. The packet-processing module changes were solely to detect that a DN
has changed from backup to primary via the arrival of encapsulated packets from the client,
in order to trigger an injection of the EN IP address into the DN routing table. Clearly,
this adds a bit of additional overhead into the data path (a single additional conditional
check is executed for every packet), but it was decided this was preferable to relying on the
EN explicitly notifying the DN it has become master. A data packet almost always arrives
more quickly at the DN than a control message, making the control message redundant
data. The use of control messages was thus deemed to be the suboptimal approach.
As described above, the reliable EN implementation has additional complexity as com-
pared to the unreliable implementation, increasing the probability that the EN itself will
experience a failure due to a bug in the code. This is unavoidable given the architecture
of the EN; in order to establish a connection properly with multiple DNs and fail over be-
tween these connections, it is necessary to modify how the EN maintains this information
internally. While the EN is more complex, it is not substantially more complex (compared
to the overall complexity of the entire system). Further, the additional logic is exercised
whenever a client changes DNs, which is expected to be a relatively frequent operation.
This increases the probability of any new bugs being exposed, since the majority of the
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changes reside in a code path that is exercised regularly.
Like the EN, the DN implementation that supports the reliable architecture is more
complex than the unmodified DN; unlike the EN, however, this complexity does not increase
the chances of a failure. This is because the system is designed to detect and handle DN
failures; if the modified DN encounters an error then either the DN will kill itself or the
DN-FD will detect the failure and kill the DN. In both cases the EN will fail over to a
secondary DN and continue passing traffic without substantial interruption.
4.3 EN-DN Mapping Table
One of the new components introduced by the reliability architecture is the EN-DN Map-
ping Table; a distributed data store that is read by the ESR and both written to and
read from by the DNs to ensure that each node in the system knows how to reach every
EN. This mapping table is structured much like a routing table, and it was decided to
take advantage of this similarity by choosing a dynamic routing protocol to implement the
EN-DN Mapping Table in Accoriem, specifically OSPF. Utilizing an existing distributed
data store reduces the chances of introducing additional software failures, since OSPF im-
plementations are relatively common and used by a large number of other systems. OSPF
was chosen over alternatives (such as RIP or IS-IS) due to its straightforward configu-
ration, well-understood behaviour, widespread deployment, and fast re-convergence time.
The OSPF protocol maintains connectivity information about every other peer in its area;
this information can be used to detect hardware failures in other DNs without requiring
additional implementation work in the DN-FD.
Once a primary DN has failed, all of the clients assigned to that DN will migrate to
other, functioning DNs, continuing operation with addresses contained within the subnet
allocated to the first DN. Upon recovering from the failure, the DN needs to ensure that
it does not assign any addresses that are already in use to new clients, otherwise they will
never receive any traffic. This is because the existing host routes will override the network
route and cause the initial client assigned this address to receive both its normal traffic and
the traffic from the newly connected host. The DN, however, is able to determine which
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addresses from its subnet are in use by other clients via its copy of the routing table. The
routing table on each DN should be synchronized, within the routing propagation time,
simplifying this process and making it DN-agnostic.
4.4 Routing-Table Growth
One concern that arose during implementation involved the size of the routing table that
would eventually result if many DNs ended up failing and if ENs were not migrated
promptly back to their primary DN upon its return to service. There are several dif-
ferent ways to solve this problem — the cleanest but most complex involves re-addressing
ENs that have failed over to a secondary DN if it is detected that no connections are
currently in use. By readdressing the EN to an address from the secondary DN pool it is
possible to remove the lingering route, ensuring that the routing table remains as small as
possible. There are two significant issues with this solution — first, detecting that an EN
has no running connections; second, there is no guarantee that an EN will ever become
ready to be readdressed (that is, an EN may continually send traffic).
An alternative approach that is both simpler and easier to manage is to inject subnet
routes instead of host routes by intelligently assigning addresses to clients. Essentially,
on startup each DN performs subnetting on the address range it is assigned, based upon
the number of other DNs that are available for an EN to fail over to. Then, as clients
connect, they are assigned an address from the range that matches with the secondary
DN to which they are connected. Thus, when the primary DN fails, each secondary DN
only has to specify that all clients in the subnetted address range are reachable though it,
instead of each host individually. One benefit that this scheme provides is that as soon
as one client detects a failure, the DN can inject the subnet route and ensure that traffic
for all ENs that were previously attached to the failed DN begin receiving the traffic they
expect (potentially before an EN even notices that the DN has failed). This reduces the
visibility of a failure even more than the base system allows for. Secondary DNs can either
be configured with the size of the subnet to assign or dynamically calculate the subnet size
based upon the number of DNs in the cluster and the addresses that the connected ENs
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have been assigned.
4.5 Routing in the DN Cluster
If the ESR is a logically separate device from the default gateway on the DN network, then
by default all decapsulated traffic from the clients will be sent to the wrong device (the
default gateway instead of the ESR). Preventing this from occurring requires the use of
source-based routing rules applied to each DN. The source-based routing rule directs all
traffic from the client subnets to the ESR instead of the default gateway, allowing the ESR
to process the decapsulated traffic as required. This source-based rule can be statically
applied at startup and does not need to change as a result of client failovers (as long as
the specified client subnet is large enough to encompass all possible client addresses). This
simplifies deployment by allowing the existing default gateway to be utilized. This will not
be necessary in situations where different network-layer protocols are used. For example,
if the EN connects to the DN over IPv4 but passes IPv6 traffic, then it is only necessary to





Using the solution implemented above, several micro-benchmarks have been run to validate
the proposal in the context of an actual implementation. The micro-benchmarks were run
in a setup consisting of five machines as illustrated in Figure 5.1: an EN running the client
software, two DNs running the server software, an ESR running standard routing software,
and a standard router acting as the Internet. The EN has two interfaces configured on
different subnets, the DNs and ESR are all located on a third subnet. All traffic uses IPv4;
the ESR performs NAT before forwarding traffic onto the Internet. The EN and DNs
are separated by a sub-millisecond-latency link with an available bandwidth of 1 Gbps
dedicated to the EN.
The performance of the system was evaluated in three different environments: one built
entirely using virtual machines, one built entirely using low-powered commodity boxes,
and one with a low-powered commodity client and a server cluster built from virtual
machines. The first environment was designed to reflect the possible ‘best case’ deployment
scenario — powerful machines all interconnected using a high-speed backbone. The second
environment was designed to show the behaviour on hardware that is truly commodity —
this hardware is obtainable by any individual for a lower cost than a typical desktop.
The final scenario was designed to represent a reasonably realistic deployment scenario —
low-powered clients such as mobile smartphones connected to a typical virtualized data
centre.
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Figure 5.1: Experimental Testbed Setup
It is important to observe that the characteristics of the test network are somewhat
different from what would be experienced on the Internet, both in terms of the latency
and bandwidth available between the EN and DN. The latency between the EN and
DN is sub-millisecond for all three testbeds, yet the latency separating the EN and the
DN on the Internet is likely to have be much higher. Conversely, while the bandwidth
of the link separating the EN and DN is one Gigabit per second, it is much more likely
to be on the order of several Megabits per second on the Internet. The exact latency
and bandwidth that exists between the EN and DN is going to depend heavily on the
specific deployment scenario; rather than attempt to characterize the performance of the
solution for all potential network configurations this thesis presents results from the best
case scenario and provides a framework to determine the impact that varying the latency
will have on the solution. The major factor that will impact this solution on the Internet is
the latency separating the EN and the DN; the minimal amount of additional information
transmitted during a failover prevents bandwidth from impacting the speed of a failover.
The OSPF routing protocol is used to synchronize the address state between the DNs
and the ESR; on the DN the chosen OSPF implementation was bird [9], an open-source
routing daemon maintained by CZ.NIC. The choice of bird over the better-known quagga
[27] was made for two reasons: quagga has some known stability issues and bird is simpler
to configure. On the ESR, the OSPF implementation selected was OpenOSPFd [26], an
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open-source implementation of OSPF developed by the OpenBSD team (and included in
the base operating system). All devices were configured as members of the OSPF backbone
area, with each daemon set to check the routing table once a second (the lowest configurable
interval) for route updates.
All of the ENs and DNs ran Ubuntu 10.04.1 with the 2.6.32-26 kernel. Each system was
configured to have TCP metric-saving disabled, to ensure that TCP behaved in the same
manner over multiple test runs. The ESR ran OpenBSD 4.7, a commonly used software
routing platform, due to its strong support for IP and firewall failover between hosts. The
virtual machines were all hosted on a VMware ESXi host consisting of an Intel Xeon E5420
processor with 12 GB of ECC RAM. All virtual machines were configured with the same
scheduling priority and each VM was assigned a single virtual processor and 256 MB of
RAM. The virtual machine host was not dedicated to the test; other machines were also
running, simulating the typical environment in which a virtual cluster would be deployed.
The virtual NICs used the standard E1000 driver. The commodity machines all had a 1.2
GHz VIA processor and 1 GB of RAM, and utilized the onboard VIA NIC.
In each failover case it is assumed that a failure had been detected and the DN-FD
process forcibly terminated the DN. This is simulated by sending a SIGKILL to the DN
process, ensuring any packets in transit were not processed and that the connections were
not properly closed. The encapsulation system has been configured to use a UDP data
channel; that is, there is no assumption that an encapsulated packet will properly arrive
at the DN. The raw test data is available online [19].
5.1 Packet Loss During Failover
For the system to be considered reliable, it is necessary not only to prevent the client
from losing connectivity, it is also necessary to ensure that any interruptions in service are
minimal, ideally small enough to be indistinguishable from normal network anomalies. To
determine the interruption of service experienced during a failover by Accoriem, a constant
stream of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets were sent from the client to
a remote server, and the number of packets that were lost when the primary DN failed
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was measured. The rate at which the ICMP packets were sent depended on the test; the
experiment was run with two rates, one of 10 packets per second (pps) and the other of 100
pps. Each of the packet rates was tested 45 times in each of the three test environments,
yielding a total of 270 data points to characterize the behaviour of the system. In every
case packets were lost consecutively — once the EN started receiving packets again, all
subsequent packets were received.
Data on the loss rate experienced by clients sending at rates higher than 100 pps
was not used because the different test environments had very different maximum packet
transmission rates — when the server cluster was hosted on virtual machines it was possible
to send packets at a rate of close to 1000 pps, yet when the server cluster was hosted on
physical machines a rate of only ∼215 pps was achieved. This difference was observed to be
the result of the relatively high CPU requirements of the encapsulation system; the physical
machine CPUs were hitting 100% utilization around 215 pps while the virtual machines did
not reach 100% CPU until around 1000 pps. The tests were conducted using the ICMP
protocol instead of TCP to avoid introducing retransmissions into the measurement —
sending both retransmitted packets in addition to new packets could introduce additional
packet delays and potentially reordering — the impact that failure has on TCP streams is
examined in Section 5.2.
The first experiment, sending packets at a rate of 100 packets per second, has results
that contain several key observations about the operation of the system. First, the be-
haviour of the system is quite similar regardless of the test environment, second, there
exists a component in the system that causes a variable but bounded number of packets
to be dropped, third, the majority of test runs on all platforms experienced approximately
1 second or less of loss. These results are summarized in Figure 5.2. For clarity, three
outlying values were omitted from the figure; the Virtual/Virtual (V/V) environment lost
approximately 250 packets twice, and the Physical/Virtual (P/V) environment lost ap-
proximately 430 packets once.
The results show that the three environments had very similar behaviour, with the
majority of measurements showing between 20 and 110 packets lost. This corresponds
to a loss of packets lasting between 1
5
th
of a second and 1 second. As was discussed in
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Figure 5.2: Packet Loss Count During A Failover (Rate of 100 Packets Per Second)
Section 3.4 there are three sources of potential delay in the failover process, and given that
several experiments showed no packet loss it is possible to have all three of these sources
of delay equal zero, resulting in a seamless failover. This occurs when the round trip time
between the EN and DN is quite small, and the time between the injection of the route
in the DN software occurs immediately before the routing daemon running on the DN
polls the system routing table for updates. One or more of these sources of delay are not
always zero, as the majority of tests experienced some packet loss. This is quite likely the
result of the time it takes the routing daemon to scan the table to detect the EN route, as
the number of packets lost is on the same order of magnitude as the scanning time. The
impact of RTT on the results is evident in the differences between the V/V environment
and the P/V and Physical/Physical (P/P) environments — when using virtualization the
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cross-node latency is effectively 0 as the network link is essentially just a shared section
of memory on the virtual machine host. In both environments that had physical latency
to contend with the packet loss times were slightly longer, shifting all the results up by a
constant factor (the RTT).
Considering other sources of delay in the system also suggests that the OSPF routing
daemon behaviour is not the only component contributing to the observed packet loss
behaviour. It is unlikely that either the EN and DN themselves are contributing to this
behaviour — neither component contains a non-uniform logic path. The DN code is always
the same regardless of a failure (the DN datapath was not modified to support failover),
and the EN codepath simply detects a failure and starts writing to the same datapath
contained in a different logical object. There is no reason that any of these elements would
have a consistently non-uniform runtime. It is expected that both the operating system
scheduler and virtual machine scheduler will schedule the DN process differently on each
test run, however the similarity of the results across testbeds running on vastly different
hardware suggests these scheduling differences do not have a significant impact on the
system performance. While the OSPF daemon was configured to scan the routing table
once every second, it is quite likely that this polling did not happen in an exactly uniform
manner — network software often adds random delays in between periodic events like
scanning to avoid potential conflicts with other nodes. One additional factor that likely
introduced some variability into the results is the amount of time it took the operating
system to detect that the DN process had been killed and subsequently close the TCP
connection. This would impact the time between T1 and T2 independent of the RTT,
however it was difficult to precisely measure the impact this factor had.
It is not quite as easy as just attributing the different packet loss rates to the routing
daemon, however, as the results in Figure 5.2 shows that each test environment has results
which tend to cluster along one of two values. For example, the V/V test environment
has results which are clustered around 200 ms and 600 ms, while the P/V environment
has results clustered near 250 ms and 1 s. This suggests that some factor like the speed
of detecting DN termination and the operating system closing all the open connections on
this DN could be responsible for the observed clustering results. There are also several
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outliers, including several measurements showing more than 250 packets lost, that could
have resulted from the DN operating system occasionally taking a long time to close the
open DN sockets.
There is really only one factor that is determined by the EN that is likely to differ in
the different test environments: the speed at which the link is determined to have died.
In the tested implementation, the link is detected as dead when the DN operating system
sends a TCP Close message to the client upon detecting that the DN daemon has died.
The OSPF polling time is DN-side, the EN does not perform packet buffering, and those
are really the only other major components that are involved during a failure event. The
processing speed of the EN is relevant only with respect to how long it takes the client to
detect link failure; it would not affect the number of packets processed because a failure
does not introduce additional logic into the data path. Consequently, it appears that the
more powerful client simply takes a shorter amount of time to detect that the link has
died.
The experiment was also performed with a transmission rate of 10 pps, the results of
these tests are shown in Figure 5.3. These results were obtained to provide a sanity check




of the results shown in Figure 5.2. This graph also omits two outliers
for clarity; the V/V environment dropped approximately 50 packets once, and the P/V
environment dropped approximately 45 packets once.
On first inspection the results in Figure 5.3 validates the results obtained in Figure
5.2 — a sending rate of 10 pps shows packet drop rates between 2 and 10 packets, which
also corresponds to an approximate loss of one second of connectivity. Clearly, the results
obtained by sending at a rate of 10 pps are likely to be a coarser representation of the
packet drop rate, this is to be expected given that there are fewer data points available
in each run to measure the performance of the system. One interesting observation which
can be made about the 10 pps experimental results is that the V/V test environment does
not show the same performance as it does in the 100 pps case — the results are clustered
around 200 ms and 1.2 s as compared to 200 ms and 600 ms. Indeed, in the 10 pps case
the P/P testbed the results show clusters around 200 ms and 1 s, showing perhaps slightly
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Figure 5.3: Packet Drop Count During A Failover (Rate of 10 Packets Per Second)
faster performance on the slowest testbed. The distribution of the clusters is also not the
same between the two test setups — the 10 pps case had results that cluster around the
smaller of the two values at approximately twice the rate experienced in the 100 pps case.
The difference between the results obtained for the different packet sending rates is
likely the result of when the packets were sent and how the system detected a failure.
In the implemented system, the backup DN asserts itself as the new primary after two
events have occurred: the EN detects that the primary DN has failed, and the backup DN
successfully receives the next packet sent by the EN. There is no out-of-band signaling
involved — the backup DN only knows of the failure after the EN has sent its next data
packet to the DN. As a result, a slower sending rate is going to mean that the ESR will, on
average, receive the updated EN host route at a later point in time. This helps to explain
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why the V/V test environment has longer failovers in the 10 pps setup, and why all three
environments show similar failover rates when the packet transmission rate is lower.
The difference in clustering ratios between the 10 pps and 100 pps case does not have
as clear an explanation; decreasing the rate of packet arrival at the backup DN would not
logically increase the likelihood that fewer packets will be dropped by the system. One
possible factor is that the lower packet rate reduces the processing overhead each system is
handling, allowing the EN to detect the failure of the primary DN more quickly, reducing
the number of packets lost. Another possible factor is that a lower packet rate enables
the operating system to more quickly detect the termination of the DN software and more
quickly close the sockets that were associated with the now-dead DN process. This would
allow the EN to be notified more quickly, reducing the number of packets lost.
From a higher-level perspective, all of the environments experienced a very small period
over which packets are lost, and the number of packets lost in all cases is also quite low. The
visibility of this packet loss will depend upon the characteristics of the application running
during a failure; web browsers will likely not experience a visible impact, streaming media
with buffering will also likely not be disrupted, while a voice call could have a noticeable
but limited interruption of service (a sub-second hiccup) with the observed packet-loss
behaviour.
5.2 Impact on Long-Lived TCP Flows
In order to measure the effect of a failure in the middle of a TCP session, a HyperText
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) file download was initiated by the EN to an Apache web server
one network hop past the ESR. Once the EN received approximately 40% of the file, the
primary DN experienced a forced failure, causing the EN to switch to the secondary DN.
The failure was triggered at the 40% mark to provide the application TCP flow sufficient
time to fully maximize its congestion window, while still allowing time for the stream to
ramp up the congestion window again after the failure. The failure results are compared
against an identical download that was conducted without the primary DN experiencing a
failure. The test is repeated 30 times each for two different sizes of files, one that is 63 MB
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and one that is 625 MB. The 625 MB file size was chosen to represent a typical video file,
while the 63 MB file size was chosen to represent a reasonably small file yet still take long
enough to download so that a failure could be introduced and measured (smaller files would
download completely before a failure could be introduced). The amount of time the file
takes to download is being used to measure the impact of a failure — if a failure increases
the download time it is considered to have had a negative impact on the behaviour of the
system.
While running the experiments on the completely physical testbed both the EN and
DN were found to be CPU-capped; it was not possible to achieve rates higher than 4.7
MB/s because neither end could process packets faster than that. The testbed consisting
of a physical client and a virtual server cluster resulted in only the EN being CPU-capped,
limiting the file download rate to around 5.3 MB/s. The completely virtual testbed was
able to obtain download rates of nearly 16 MB/s. The VMs were not able to saturate the
Gigabit link due to packet and processing overheads. However, the relative speeds of these
environments are not the focus of this set of experiments — TCP segment loss and total
download times are.
It is hypothesized that a DN failure will not cause a noticeable delay in the download of
a file, based upon the packet loss numbers observed in Section 5.1. In the following analysis,
the null hypothesis is that a failure will not cause a noticeable increase in file download
times; the alternative hypothesis is that a failure does cause a noticeable increase in file
download times.
Table 5.1 shows the average download times (in seconds), the standard deviations of the
download times (in seconds), and the 95% confidence ranges (in seconds) for the results of
both file sizes in all of the test environments. Due to the physical client being CPU-bound
it can be observed that the P/V and P/P tests had longer average download times. It
is also observed that in all cases the average download time increased when a failure was
simulated, and in almost all cases the standard deviation was higher for the failure case —
this is expected based upon the packet loss rates discussed in Section 5.1.
To determine whether the increases in average download times and standard deviation
under the failure cases are statistically significant, the following approach is used. First,
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Table 5.1: Impact of Failure on HTTP File Download Times (UDP channel)
63 MB File 625 MB File
Mean Std Dev 95% Conf Int Mean Std Dev 95% Conf Int
Typical (V/V) 4.326 0.571 0.204 40.284 3.406 1.219
Failure (V/V) 5.784 1.471 0.526 42.993 2.892 1.035
Typical (P/V) 11.823 0.149 0.053 123.296 2.119 0.758
Failure (P/V) 14.060 2.204 0.886 123.605 2.421 0.866
Typical (P/P) 13.656 0.094 0.033 141.180 2.473 0.885
Failure (P/P) 15.342 1.703 0.609 142.603 2.723 0.974
to determine the type of test statistic to use, it is necessary to determine whether the raw
test data follows a normal distribution. The one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run
on each of the 12 data sets of 30 runs each assuming a normal distribution. The results
are in Table 5.2, which shows both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-statistic and the 2-tailed
asymptotic significance of each case.
In none of the three typical small file size cases it is possible to reject the null hypothesis
of normality as the asymptotic significance exceeds 10%. In all cases where a failure was
forced with the 63 MB file the normality of the test data is rejected at a 1% significance
level. Nonetheless, since there is a sample size of 30 runs for both typical and failure cases
it is possible to rely upon the Central Limit Theorem and conduct a standard difference-
of-means test. For robustness, however, it is possible to augment the difference-of-means
test with a difference-of-medians test for the 63 MB file size simulations. For the 625 MB
file size simulations it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the test data follows
a normal distribution at a 5% significance level in all cases, and at the 10% level in all but
the typical virtual/virtual case. Thus, it is possible to rely upon the standard z-test for
the difference of means.
Given that the null hypothesis is structured in an equals/not-equals fashion, the two-
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Table 5.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normality on the HTTP File Download Times
(UDP channel)
63 MB File 625 MB File
K-S Z-Stat Asympt Sig (2-tail) K-S Z-Stat Asympt Sig (2-tail)
Typical (V/V) 1.191 0.117 1.236 0.094
Failure (V/V) 1.746 0.005 1.089 0.187
Typical (P/V) 0.932 0.350 0.910 0.379
Failure (P/V) 1.760 0.004 0.852 0.462
Typical (P/P) 0.965 0.310 0.814 0.522
Failure (P/P) 2.130 0.000 0.562 0.910
tailed test for significance will be used. The test statistic under consideration is the t-
statistic:
t =











where x̄ is the sample mean, µ is the hypothesized value of the sample mean, and s is the
standard deviation. Given that the majority of the measurements have been determined to
fit a normal distribution using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the difference-of-means z-test
was chosen to test the null hypothesis that the average download time for the failure case
equals that of the typical case in order to demonstrate that a failure does not noticeably
increase the download time of the file. The variances of the typical and failure cases in
each environment have been measured as being different, so each sample variance is used
to estimate the variability of the population. The results of the difference-of-means tests
for each test situation can be found in Table 5.3.
To verify the above difference-of-means test, a Wilcoxon two-sample test is used to
determine whether the typical and failure cases have the same median value. The median
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Table 5.3: Difference-of-Mean HTTP File Download Times (UDP channel)
63 MB File 625 MB File
V/V 1.458 s * 2.710 s *
P/V 2.238 s * 0.309 s
P/P 1.686 s * 1.423 s **
* Reject, 1% Significance
** Reject, 5% Significance
download times, and the differences, are shown in Table 5.4. In all cases except the 625 MB
file being download by a physical EN through a virtual DN, both the difference-of-means
test and the difference-of-medians test shows that the typical and failure download times
differ by a statistically significant amount.
One final test is to see if introducing a failure changes the uncertainty about the down-
load time. In this case, the uncertainty is measured using the standard deviation of the
download time across the 30 test runs. It is possible to use the F-distribution to test the
null hypothesis that the typical and failure test runs have the same variance. In this case





where S1 is the standard deviation of Sample 1 and S2 is the standard deviation of Sample
2. This test statistic needs to exceed 1 so Sample 1 is chosen to be the one with the larger
value. This test statistic is distributed with (29,29) degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis
of equal variance is rejected for all small file cases, but it is not possible to reject the null
for the large file cases. Based upon these results, the null hypothesis has been dis-proven
and a failure does cause a statistically significant increase in the download time of the file.
Given that there is a statistically significant difference in file download times, the ques-
tion becomes whether this increase is significant to users of the system. Table 5.3 shows
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Table 5.4: Difference-of-Median HTTP File Download Times (UDP channel)
63 MB File 625 MB File
Median D/L Time Median D/L Time
Typical Failure Delta Typical Failure Delta
V/V 4.195 s 5.426 s 1.234 s * 40.025 s 21.723 s 1.698 s *
P/V 11.782 s 13.144 s 1.362 s * 122.556 s 123.21 s 0.661 s
P/P 13.620 s 14.877 s 1.258 s * 141.073 s 142.229 s 1.156 s **
* Reject, 1% Significance
** Reject, 5% Significance
that at most 2.7 seconds was added to the download time; with more than half of the
experiments adding under 2 seconds to the download time. It is important to observe that
the amount of the delay did not depend on the size of the file; the system introduces a
reasonably fixed amount of time to each file download. This is entirely expected — the
system downloads part of the file normally, experiences a brief period where the download
slows down as it recovers from the failure, and then resumes downloading the file normally.
In the 63 MB file download on the V/V testbed the slowdown period constituted a signifi-
cant portion of the total download time because both of the normal periods elapsed quite
quickly, however in the 625 MB file download the P/P testbed the slowdown period was
a minor component of the total download time because both normal periods lasted much
longer.
The size of the file being downloaded and the available bandwidth of the link then
determines whether the slowdown caused by the failure is significant to the user. The
testbeds used to perform these experiments are a somewhat unrealistic simulation of In-
ternet behaviour as links rarely have an available rate of 1 Gbps. A smaller link rate will
increase the amount of time it takes to download a file of equal size, and given that a failure
has been shown to introduce a fixed amount of time to a download the relative impact of
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a failure will decrease as the link rate decreases. Given that each application has different
requirements it is not realistic to state that this solution is going to provide a suitable
failover speed for all environments, but it is possible to say that a failure introduces a
fixed, several second delay to an HTTP download.
5.3 Impact of TCP Retransmissions
The increase in download times was initially believed to be the result of packets lost in
the failover process; measuring the TCP retransmission statistics on the web server showed
that a variable number of segments were retransmitted during each run. The exact number
of retransmissions were plotted against the total download time in Figure 5.4 and in Figure
5.5 for the P/P testbed. The scatter plots of retransmissions versus download times shows
that there is no obvious correlation between the number of retransmitted packets and the
amount of time the file took to download. Also, the retransmission behaviour of the system
varied depending on the size of the file. In the 63 MB file case, there appears to be a few
very distinct download times (15 seconds, 16 seconds, 20 seconds) that are measured with
a wide range in the number of retransmitted packets — the system was able to download
the file in 15 seconds while retransmitting between 3 and 73 segments. In the 625 MB file
case, the amount of time the file took to download was not quite as strictly aligned, but it
still exhibited a single download time (around 141 seconds) while retransmitting between
3 and 100 segments.
It is expected that the exact number of packets that need to be retransmitted will vary
based upon a number of factors, particularly where the TCP stream was with respect to
the outstanding acknowledgments when the failure occurred as well as a variety of other
tuning parameters that are dependent on the current state of the TCP stream. However,
it was initially expected that this would correspond to the amount of time the file ended
up taking to download — because retransmissions slow down the TCP stream and increase
download times in standard packet-loss scenarios. The measured results suggest that the
increase in download times is not only being caused by TCP retransmissions; there is
another aspect of the system that is influencing the behaviour of the TCP stream during
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Figure 5.4: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (63 MB File, P/P)
the failover. If TCP retransmissions were solely responsible for the slowdown then Figure
5.4 and Figure 5.5 would show that test runs with more retransmissions would take longer;
however, the results do not show this. Two other factors that contribute to the increase
in download time have been previously discussed — the variable amount of time taken by
the OSPF routing daemon to update the routing tables in the cluster, and the variable
amount of time it takes the EN to detect that the primary DN has failed.
It is likely that the TCP retransmissions do have some impact on the performance of
the system; as discussed in Section 5.1 the system experience between 200 ms and one
second worth of packet loss when only ICMP packets were sent, yet Table 5.3 shows that
a HTTP session experiences up to 2.7 seconds worth of delay during a failure. There are
clearly some differences in the two scenarios — a significant difference is that the ICMP
scenario did not send packets at the maximum rate supported by the link. As was observed
in Section 5.1 the system had a higher probability of taking one second to recover from
a failure when packets were sent at 100 pps as compared to 10 pps; this suggests that
higher packet rates negatively impact the speed of recovery from a failure. This likely
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Figure 5.5: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (625 MB File, P/P)
contributes to TCP sessions experiencing a longer interruption than a stream of ICMP
packets; it is also likely that TCP retransmissions contribute to TCP sessions exhibiting a
slower recovery from DN failure than an ICMP stream.
The retransmission behaviour of TCP in the physical/virtual environment is similar to
both the purely virtual and the purely physical environment as shown by Figure 5.6 and
Figure 5.7.
As the scatter plot of segment retransmission count to download time shows in both Fig-
ure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, the fully virtual environment experiences the same results whereby
the number of retransmitted segments does not correlate to the download time of the file.
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Figure 5.6: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (63 MB File, P/V)
Figure 5.7: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (625 MB File, P/V)
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Figure 5.8: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (63 MB File, V/V)
Figure 5.9: Impact of Retransmissions on Download Time (625 MB File, V/V)
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5.4 Impact of Reliable Encapsulated Packet Delivery
The results shown in Table 5.1 show the behaviour of the system during a failover from a
UDP data channel to another UDP data channel. While a UDP data channel is preferable
over a TCP data channel for a number of previously elaborated reasons, it is sometimes
necessary to utilize TCP for the data channel. The behaviour of a TCP channel is suffi-
ciently different than that of a UDP channel to believe that the previously obtained results
are not an accurate reflection of the failover times that a system with a TCP data chan-
nel would experience. This comes from the well-understood impact of running TCP over
TCP [28] — namely that in the case of packet loss the back-off algorithm implemented
by TCP causes the connection to degrade quickly. To determine the impact that using
a reliable data channel has on failover times, the experiments run in Section 5.2 were re-
peated with Accoriem configured to utilize a TCP data channel. Instead of having 30
experimental runs for each case, only 15 were performed for each case.
The results of running the HTTP file download test on the P/P and V/V testbeds
are shown in Table 5.5, which contains both the mean download times and the standard
deviation of each set of download times. The run times without failure are similar to those
found previously in Table 5.1. The use of a TCP tunnel introduces additional overhead into
the system, however. The congestion-control algorithm limits the number of outstanding
packets based upon the current packet-loss state; since UDP does not implement this there
is a period of time as the TCP tunnel is ramping up that it transmits slower than UDP.
This increases the time it takes to download an equivalently sized file. Also, the extra
12 bytes of header in every TCP packet increases the required number of bytes that are
transmitted to completely download a file, also increasing the time a file download will
take. This is demonstrated in Table 5.5, where the 63 MB file took an additional 0.2
seconds to download, and the 625 MB file took an additional 3.5 seconds to download.
The header overhead negatively impacts larger files more than smaller files because per-
packet overhead is cumulative, while the additional congestion-control overhead is the same
regardless of file size because congestion-control overhead is determined by packet loss, not
file size.
During a failure the impact of using a TCP tunnel is more visible; the 63 MB file takes
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Table 5.5: Impact of Failure on HTTP File Download Times (TCP channel)
63 MB File 625 MB File
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Typical (V/V) 4.150 s 0.285 s 39.777 s 2.522 s
Failure (V/V) 8.382 s 1.990 s 48.519 s 2.702 s
Typical (P/P) 13.898 s 0.183 s 145.534 s 2.621 s
Failure (P/P) 16.924 s 0.937 s 150.279 s 6.949 s
approximately 4 seconds to recover from a failure, while the 625 MB file takes nearly 10
seconds to recover. This is a drastic change from the UDP tunnel results, where both
the 63 MB file and the 625 MB file managed to recover in less than 3 seconds. The
impact of packet loss rates with a UDP tunnel were explored in Section 5.2, and it was
determined that the three main causes of delay in failure recovery were the OSPF daemon
routing-table scan time, the amount of time it took the EN to detect a failure, and the
HTTP TCP session retransmitting the lost packets. The results in Table 5.5 show that
running a TCP-based HTTP download over a TCP-based data channel results in even
worse performance than using a UDP tunnel — the question is why. The OSPF daemon
routing-table scan time did not change, and the EN should be able to detect a failure just
as quickly because the failure detection mechanism is independent of the tunnel transport
protocol. Therefore, the increase in recovery time is likely due to the interaction of packet
retransmission between the HTTP TCP session and the Accoriem TCP session. The HTTP
download is forced to wait for more packets as Accoriem retransmits the packets that were
lost in its TCP session. The loss of packets causes Accoriem to back off, which delays the
acknowledgments to the HTTP session which forces it to back off. This effect causes the
HTTP download to slow down much more than if it was handling packet loss recovery (as
it does when using a UDP tunnel. This is, fundamentally, why TCP-in-TCP is considered
to be such a bad idea — small slowdowns at one point in the link have a cascading effect
on all of the internal traffic.
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5.5 Experimental Observations
While evaluating the implementation it was noticed that, immediately following a failover,
the IP time-to-live (TTL) values on packets being sent to the client through the encapsula-
tion system were one hop smaller than expected for a short (∼50 ms) period of time, before
returning to the expected value. It was discovered that this was caused by the particular
OSPF implementations used (bird on the DNs and OpenOSPFd on the ESR). While the
OSPF update is received at both the primary DN and the ESR immediately following a
failover (verified using packet traces), it appears that bird applies these updates immedi-
ately while OpenOSPFd applies these updates approximately 50 ms later. Consequently,
packets being sent from the ESR were routed to the primary DN, which then routed them
to the secondary DN, which then sent them to the client properly. While this does not
impact our experimental results (because the primary DN was still accessible), this would
clearly introduce another delay (of around 50 ms) into the system should the primary DN
be unable to route packets (either due to a hardware failure or a routing table error).
While experimenting in the virtual environment, it was observed that the choice of
virtual network driver impacts the speed of failover; the system experienced slightly slower
failover when using the VMXNET3 driver as compared to the E1000 driver. The resulting
performance difference could be a result of how the VMXNET3 driver handles the initial-
connection process or it could be due to the VMXNET3 driver being manually compiled
on the virtual machines (E1000 support is built into the Linux kernel, VMXNET3 is not).
Either way, the E100 driver was selected for all of the experiments.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis has presented a new architecture for developing fault-tolerant encapsulation
systems that support IP continuity without requiring complex server-side state synchro-
nization. Not only does this solution provide transparent failover between DNs, it does so
in a manner that is relatively straightforward to configure and expand as additional DNs
are required. The proposal was validated via an implementation that is integrated into
an existing encapsulation solution, and it was demonstrated that the costs of adopting
this approach are minimal. Experimentally, it was shown that this solution functions for
both unreliable and reliable protocols (ICMP and HTTP, respectively), introducing only
minor packet loss during a failure event while providing IP continuity across endpoints.
This encapsulation reliability architecture has been adopted by a commercial encapsulation
solution (Pravala’s Accoriem) to allow for transparent failure of decapsulators.
6.2 Future Work
The solution previously presented has focused entirely on handling DN failures in a cluster
that is co-located — the DNs and ESR are all located on the same subnet. This is required
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to ensure that the encapsulated IP address exposed by each client is routed properly, with
all traffic going through the ESR and the proper DN. While adding a high level of reliability
to a cluster located in a single datacentre, it does nothing to allow the client to seamlessly
fail over in the case of a datacentre failure. Dealing with datacentre failover is a much more
complex problem because it becomes necessary to redirect traffic destined to a specific IP
prefix to a new datacentre. The process of designing and developing the solution in this
thesis included some work in solving this problem, but there are a number of issues that
need to be handled before any solution is ready for deployment. This includes determining
an efficient way to allow the same IP address subnet to be announced to the Internet
from multiple, distinct physical locations, and quickly updating distributed routing tables
in a manner to ensure that complete loss of any one location does not prevent the other
locations from being able to quickly take over responsibility for the shared address space.
The encapsulation endpoint reliability architecture presented to this point has been
entirely focused on providing IP continuity in the event of a DN failure; however there are
many additional situations in which the ability to transparently migrate a client from one
DN to another would prove to be useful. Another situation in which the above architecture
can be utilized is DN load balancing, where clients from overloaded DNs can be migrated
to less heavily loaded DNs without interrupting client traffic. Integrating dynamic load
balancing into the design is conceptually a relatively straightforward process — when it
is determined that a server has become too heavily loaded, it can simply close a set (all
hosts in a subnet) of client connections and trust that they will fail over to their backup
DN. Determining which set of hosts to kill is likely to be one of the most difficult parts of
integrating this functionality into the system.
While implementing the architecture it became apparent that it may be possible to
implement a similar solution without any changes on the DN; depending on the design of
the DN a separate module running on the same machine could enable similar functionality.
Such a module would enable existing encapsulation systems to support transparent failover
with only client-side changes, simplifying deployment and speeding adoption. This module
would work by sniffing incoming traffic on the DN client-connected interfaces and recording
which IP address is assigned to which connection. The module would then sniff every packet
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prior to its reception by the DN, look for any addresses not included in the DNs address
pool, and perform IP replacement on the encapsulated IP header prior to its processing
by the DN. This will enable the host to continue using its old IP address, while the DN
receives the packet as if it came from a new one (a crude form of NAT, in effect). This
approach requires application-level intelligence though, making it difficult to develop a
generic module for all encapsulation systems. As well, this approach requires that the
payload of the packets be unencrypted (though encryption could be handled by extending
this approach into a full-blown proxy running in tandem with the DN). This solution is
not investigated further here because the authors had full control over the implementation
of both the EN and the DN; however, it could be worth investigating further if others






CARP Common Address Redundancy Protocol
CPU Central Processing Unit
DFZ Default Free Zone
DN Decapsulation Node
DN-FD Decapsulation Node-Failure Detector
EN Encapsulation Node
ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol
ESR Edge Service Router
FT-TCP Fault-Tolerant Transmission Control Protocol
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
HSRP Hot Standby Router Protocol
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
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IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
ISP Internet Service Provider
L2 Layer 2
L3 Layer 3
MAC Media Access Control
NAT Network Address Translation





RIP Routing Information Protocol
SCTP Stream Control Transfer Protocol
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
V/V Virtual/Virtual
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
VRRP Virtual Routing Redundacy Protocol
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